Abstract. Designing an ID based signcryption scheme in the standard model is among the most interesting and important problems in cryptography. However, all the existing systems in the ID based setting, in the standard model, do not have either the unforgeability property or the indistinguishability property or both of them. In this paper, we present the first provably secure ID based signcryption scheme in the standard model with both these properties. The unforgeability property of this scheme is based on the hardness of Computational Diffie-Hellman problem and the indistinguishability property of this scheme is based on the hardness of Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. Our scheme is strongly unforgeable in the strong attack mode called insider security. Moreover, our scheme possess an interesting property called public verifiability of the ciphertext. Our scheme integrates cleverly, a modified version of Waters' IBE and a suitably modified version of the ID based signature scheme in the standard model proposed by Paterson et al. However, our security reductions are more efficient. Specifically, while the security reductions for indistinguishability is similar to the bounds of Waters' scheme, the unforgeability reductions are way better than the bounds for Paterson et al.'s scheme.
Introduction
Signcryption aims at providing the confidentiality property of encryption and authentication and nonrepudiation properties of signature simultaneously with a cost significantly less than the cost of performing encryption and signature separately. This notion was introduced by Zheng [31] in 1997. The reduction in the computational and communication cost makes the scheme more practical and hence it has numerous real time applications. Fast, compact, secure, unforgeable and non-repudiated key transport, multi-cast, electronic commerce, authenticated email are some of the areas where signcryption is highly applicable.
ID based cryptography, introduced by Shamir in 1984 [22] suggests the use of user identity, such as his e-mail address or his telephone number, as his public key rather than using some arbitrary strings which requires certificates from the Certificate Authority (CA). A Private Key Generator (PKG) is a trusted entity which when given a user's identity computes the private key for the corresponding user and returns it to the user through a secure channel. This method eliminates the need for certificates, which were used in the conventional public key setting.
that are secure in standard model. It should be noted that the systems that are secure in standard model are in general computationally more expensive than the systems that are secure in random oracle model. We need to pay such an extra cost due to more stringent demands of standard models.
The first ID based signcryption scheme without random oracles was proposed by Yu et al. in 2009 [28] based on Waters' ID based encryption [26] . But their scheme was shown CPA insecure by Wang et al. [24] , Zhang et al. [30] and Zhang [29] . Zhang [29] also showed that [28] is SUF-insecure. Meanwhile, Ren and Gu [27] proposed a Signcryption scheme based on Gentry's IBE [9] but it was shown by Wang et al. [25] that it has neither confidentiality nor existential unforgeability. An improved semantically secure scheme was proposed by Jin, Wen and Du [11] again based on Waters IBE but Li et al. [13] showed that the scheme in [11] satisfies neither IND-CCA2 property nor EUF-CMA property. Zhang [29] also proposed a new scheme. But Li et al. in 2011 [15] showed that Zhang's scheme [29] did not have IND-CPA property and they proposed a new scheme claiming it to have both IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA properties. But the new scheme in [15] satisfies neither IND-CCA2 property nor EUF-CMA property as shown by Selvi et al. in [21] . Li et al. [14] proposed another scheme based on IBE proposed by Kiltz et al. [12] and IBS proposed by Paterson et al. [20] . But Selvi et al. [21] have also shown that there are inconsistencies in the proof of security of [14] , thus concluding that all the ID based signcryption schemes proposed till now for the standard model are not provably secure. Selvi et al. [21] have also concluded that achieving a provably secure ID based signcryption scheme in the standard model through direct combination of an ID based signature scheme and an ID based encryption scheme can only be done by the Sign then Encrypt approach. However, for any Sign then Encrypt scheme, cost of signcryption = cost of signature+cost of encryption. But our objective of designing a signcryption scheme is to have a scheme that has cost of signcryption < cost of signature + cost of encryption [31] . Hence we need to take a fresh look at the design of the signcryption protocol and arrive at an efficient customized scheme of signcryption. In the subsequent section we present one such novel scheme and formally prove its security.
Hea An, Dodis and Rabin in 2002 [1] introduced the notion of strong unforgeability, to avoid the problems due to malleability. If a scheme is malleable, then an adversary can produce a valid signature on a message when another valid signature on the same message is available. So, they proved the unforgeability property of their signcryption scheme using this strong notion. A signature scheme becomes non-malleable when it satisfies this property. There are several transformations available in literature to convert an EUF-CMA secure scheme to a SUF-CMA secure scheme for signature schemes. Some of the transformations available for the standard model are the transformations proposed by Boneh et al. [4] , Bellare et al. [3] , Teranishi et al. [23] and Huang et al. [10] .
The public ciphertext verifiability property of a scheme is very useful in low power devices. This property allows any third party application, like firewalls, to verify the validity of the sender and ciphertext without any interaction with the receiver i.e without knowing the receiver's secret key. This will allow the application to prevent the ciphertexts, modified by an adversary, from reaching the devices. Only valid ciphertexts can reach them, thus preventing unnecessary use of their resources for decrypting the invalid ciphertexts. Here, the important property is that, the third party application while verifying should not obtain any knowledge about the message that is signcrypted. This property is provided by the signcryption scheme proposed by Chow et al. [8] . But that scheme was proven secure only in the random oracle model.
Our Contribution
In this paper we present the first provably secure ID based signcryption scheme without random oracles. Our scheme is based on the ID based signature scheme in the standard model proposed by Paterson et al. [20] , which in turn is based on the PKI based signature scheme proposed by Waters [26] . We base the IND-CCIA2 property of our scheme on the hardness of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption and the SUF-CMIA property of our scheme on the hardness of the Computational Diffie Hellman assumption. The property of strong unforgeability is present in our scheme even without using any of the transformations available to convert an existentially unforgeable scheme to a strongly unforgeable scheme in the standard model. The proposed scheme also offers insider security with respect to both confidentiality and unforgeability which ensures that the signcryption scheme is secure even when one among the sender or the receiver colludes with the adversary against the other. The scheme proposed exhibits the crucial property of public ciphertext verifiability. Recall that all the ID based signcryption schemes in the standard model such as [28] , [27] , [11] , [29] and [15] are completely broken and the most recent scheme proposed by Li et al. [14] has flaws in the proof. Even if the flaws in the proof of [14] are fixed, our scheme has the following advantages over [14] .
-The security of our scheme is based on a harder assumption i.e DBDH, compared to the modified DBDH (mDBDH) used by [14] . -Our scheme has a tighter security reduction.
-Our scheme is more efficient than the one in [14] .
Organisation
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, preliminaries like bilinear pairing, computational assumptions, a generic ID based signcryption scheme, formal security model for ID based signcryption scheme are explained. We present our ID based signcryption scheme in section 3. We prove the confidentiality property and the strong unforgeability property of our scheme in section 4. The efficiency of our scheme is explained in section 5 and the paper is concluded in section 6.
Preliminaries

Bilinear Pairing
Let G and G T be multiplicative groups of prime order p and let g be generator of G. The bilinear mapê is admissible only if it satisfies the following conditions: g 2 ) = I G T , where I G T is the identity element of G T . -Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(g 1 , g 2 ) for all g 1 , g 2 ∈ G.
Computational Assumptions
In this section, we review the computational assumptions relevant to the protocol we propose.
Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the CDH problem in G is defined as:
The CDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv CDH A is negligibly small.
abc .
Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the DBDH problem in G is defined as:
The DBDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv DBDH A is negligibly small.
ID based Signcryption
A generic ID based signcryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
-Setup: This algorithm is run by the Private Key Generator (PKG). When given a security parameter k, this algorithm outputs public parameters params and a master secret key MSK. PKG keeps the corresponding MSK as its secret value. -Extract: When given an Identity ID, the PKG runs this algorithm using the params and MSK and generates the private key d u for the user. The PKG then transmits the generated private key to the corresponding user through a secure channel. -Signcrypt: This algorithm is run by the sender. It takes as input, the public parameters params, the private key d A of the sender, the identity of the receiver ID B and the message m to be sent to the receiver. The signcryption σ is produced as output which is sent to the receiver. -Unsigncrypt: On receiving the signcryption σ from the sender, the receiver runs this algorithm. The public parameters params, the identity of the sender ID A , the private key of the receiver d B and the signcryption σ are given as input to this algorithm. The message m is obtained as output if the signcryption is valid or ⊥ is given as output. 
Security model for ID based signcryption
Indistinguishability In 2002, Malone-Lee [18] proposed the first ID based signcryption scheme. He extended the semantic security of encryption schemes to signcryption schemes as Indistinguishability of ID based signcryption under Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-IBSC-CCA2). Later, Chow et al. [8] used a stronger notion of security by allowing the adversary to adaptively choose the identities to create a forgery during the challenge phase. This is similar to the one proposed in [16] . This model was termed as Indistinguishability of ID based signcryption under Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext and Identity Attack (IND-IBSC-CCIA2). This is the strongest notion available in the literature for proving the Indistinguishability property of the signcryption schemes. The formal definition is given below. A signcryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext and identity attack (IND-IBSC-CCIA2) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm and sends the public parameters to the adversary A 2. Training Phase 1: The adversary A can ask a polynomially bound number of queries to the following oracles.
-Extract Oracle: When A queries for the private key of an identity ID, the challenger C runs the Extract algorithm giving the ID and params as input. C forwards the private key d u of ID output by the Extract algorithm to A. Unforgeability Malone-Lee [18] proposed the Existential Unforgeability of ID based signcryption under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-IBSC-CMA). Later, Chow et al. [8] proposed a stronger notion of security called Existential Unforgeability of ID based signcryption under Chosen Message and Identity Attack (EUF-IBSC-CMIA), where the adversary can not only choose the message to attack adaptively but also the identities on which it is going to attack. This notion is defined by the game between challenger and adversary as given below.
An ID based signcryption scheme is said to have the property of Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message and Identity Attack if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm and generates the public parameters and the Master Secret
Key MSK. C then gives the public parameters params to the adversary A 2. Now the adversary A can ask a polynomially bound number of queries to any of the following oracles.
-Extract Oracle: When A queries for the private key of an identity ID, the challenger C runs the Extract algorithm giving the ID, params and MSK as input. C forwards the output d u given by the algorithm to the adversary A. The advantage of adversary A in the above game is defined by
In this security model, the importance is that the adversary can query the Extract oracle for the identity of the receiver ID * B in the above game which captures the insider security model for unforgeability. So, even when the private key of the intended receiver is leaked, the adversary A will not have any added advantage in producing a valid forgery in the above game. But the restriction here is that m * , ID *
A , ID * B should not have been queried already to the Signcrypt oracle. The work done by Li et al. [14] has used similar security models which provide insider security.
Strong Unforgeability Hea An et al. [1] proposed that there is no necessity for an adversary to produce forgery on a message that is not already queried. Forgery can also be produced on the message that is queried already to the Signcrypt oracle with the condition that the forged signcryption on m is not the same as the one that is output by the Signcrypt oracle for the same message m, with the same sender and the same receiver as the forgery. This notion is called Strong Unforgeability. Our new scheme satisfies the notion of Strong Unforgeability of ID based signcryption under Chosen Message and Identity Attack (SUF-IBSC-CMIA). This is the strongest security notion available for proving the unforgeability property of signcryption schemes. We state this notion formally as follows.
An ID based signcryption scheme is said to have the property of Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Message and Identity Attack if there is no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the game described as follows. 
In the above security model, A can produce any valid σ * , ID * A , ID * B tuple for the message m * , where m * , σ * is not the output of any Signcrypt query with ID * A and ID * B as the sender and receiver identities during the training phase. So, m * may have been queried already to the Signcrypt oracle provided that σ * is not the output of the oracle during that query with the sender and receiver identities being the same during that query and the forgery.
Our Scheme
Setup
Consider groups G, G T of prime order p whose size is determined by the security parameter k. Let g be the generator of the group G. There exists a bilinear map defined byê : G × G → G T , which is efficiently computable. Now, choose α ∈ Z p randomly and compute g 1 = g α . Randomly pick g 2 , h 2 from G and compute g α 2 , h α 2 . Also, choose h 1 , h 3 randomly from G. Choose u , v , m randomly from the group G and also choose vectors U = (u i ) and V = (v i ) each of length n u and M = (m i ) of length l, whose elements are randomly chosen from group G. Here, n u is the length of the identity strings that are used. Let n m be the length of the message sent. There are four one-way, collision resistant cryptographic hash functions
p , where l is large enough that the hash functions are collision resistant and l τ ≈ 40. Note that a typical value of l could be 256 and a random bit string of length l cannot be guessed in polynomial time. The system parameter params is given by G,
The master secret key of the system is α, g α 2 , h α 2 . The following algorithms define our scheme.
Extract(u, params, MSK)
Let an identity of a user u be represented by ID u which is a bit string of length n u and let ID u [i] be the i th bit of ID u . Define Ω u ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n u } to be the set of indices i such that ID u [i] = 1. The private key of a user u is constructed by choosing a random r u ∈ Z * p and then computing
The private key of the sender A with identity ID A as given by the PKG is
where Ω A ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n u } is the set of indices i such that ID A [i] = 1. Now, when given a message m ∈ {0, 1} nm signcryption on the message is done by the sender A as follows.
-Choose r ∈ Z p randomly and compute σ 1 = g r ∈ G
-Encrypt the message as
where Ω B is the set of vertices i such that ID B [i] = 1. Here, B is the receiver of the message.
where β ⊆ {1, 2, ..., l} denotes the set of indices j such
The ciphertext σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 , τ is sent to the receiver.
The size of the ciphertext formed is 4|p| + n m + l τ . Note that this scheme achieves the property of strong unforgeability without using any of the transformations available to convert an existentially unforgeable scheme to a strongly unforgeable one.
When the receiver B receives the ciphertext σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 , τ , he proceeds as follows.
-The private key d B received from the PKG is
-Then, using β, ρ and λ, check the validity of σ as followŝ
where Ω A is the set of indices i such that ID A [i] = 1 and β ⊆ {1, 2, ..., l} denotes the set of indices j such that
-If σ is invalid, reject σ and halt.
The above verification process stated in equation (1) can be done by any user who has access to σ, because all the components used in the verification process are either the values in params g, g 1 , g 2 , u , U, m , M, h 1 , h 3 , components of the ciphertext σ 1 , σ 4 , σ 5 or components that are derived from the ciphertext λ, β, ρ . and thus the integrity and validity of the sender and the ciphertext can be verified by anyone. This gives the property of Public Ciphertext Verifiability to our scheme.
Correctness of the Unsigncrypt algorithm
When the receiver B receives the ciphertext σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 , τ , he can calculateê (g 1 , h 2 ) r using his
The correctness of the verification procedure is shown below.
where the definitions of β and Ω A are as explained in the Unsigncrypt algorithm.
Security
Indistinguishability
We first prove the Indistinguishability property, Indistinguishability of ID based signcryption under Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext and Identity Attack (IND-IBSC-CCIA2) of our scheme with the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
If there exists an IND-IBSC-CCIA2 adversary for our scheme which can distinguish ciphertexts during the IND-IBSC-CCIA2 game explained above, with a non-negligible probability when it runs for a polynomial time t, asking at most q E extract queries, q S signcrypt queries and q U S unsigncrypt queries, then there exists another algorithm, which can solve the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem with probability in polynomial time t , where
where n u is the length of the identity string, t m , t e , t p are the time required for each multiplication, each exponentiation and each bilinear pairing respectively and l is a value large enough such that the hash functions outputting {0, 1} l in the scheme are collision resistant.
Proof
Let us assume that a ( , t, q E , q S , q U S )-adversary A for our scheme exists. We will construct another algorithm B from this adversary A, who can solve the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem with a non-negligible probability in polynomial time t . The algorithm B receives a DBDH tuple g, g a , g b , g c , T ∈ G 4 × G T , where g is a generator of a prime order group G of order p. B simulates a challenger for the adversary A to decide whether T isê(g, g) abc or not. This simulation is described as follows:
Setup
The simulator B sets l u = 2(q E ), where q E is the number of Extract queries. Here, the values q S and q U S are not bounded because the Signcrypt and the Unsigncrypt queries do not abort when an Extract query of the sender or receiver identity, used in any Signcrypt or Unsigncrypt query, aborts. This will be evident from the explanation for the Signcrypt and the Unsigncrypt oracles. B then chooses an integer k u randomly such that 0 ≤ k u ≤ n u . For the given values of q E , q S , q U S and n u , we assume that l u (n u + 1) < p. Then, B chooses x ∈ Z lu randomly and also chooses a vector X = (x i ) of length n u where the elements of X are chosen randomly from Z lu . B chooses an integer y randomly from Z p and a vector Y = (y i ) of length n u , where the elements of Y are also chosen randomly from Z p .
Here we define a pair of functions for a user with identity ID u as follows:
The simulator now sets the public parameters as follows:
where d and θ are chosen randomly from Z p and λ
The values g a , g b , g c are from the DBDH tuple given to the challenger C.
Finally, B chooses two integers e and f randomly from Z p and two vectors E = (e i ) and F = (f i ) of lengths n u and n m respectively, where the elements of E and F are chosen randomly from Z p .
For any identity ID
where Ω u ⊆ {1, 2, .., n u } is the set of indices i where ID u [i] = 1.
For any β got for a message m as explained in the scheme,
There are four one-way, collision resistant, cryptographic hash functions
where l is large enough that the hash functions are collision resistant and l τ ≈ 40. Note that a typical value of l could be 256 and a random bit string of length l cannot be guessed in polynomial time.
Training Phase 1
The simulator during this phase answers to the queries from the adversary A as follows.
Extract Queries
The simulator B does not know the master secret key h a 2 . So, when the adversary A asks for the private key of an identity ID u , B responds as follows. B calculates F (u) for the identity ID u . If F (u) = 0 mod p, it aborts. Otherwise, B randomly chooses r u ∈ Z p and calculates the private key as
where Ω u ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n u } is the set of indices i such that ID u [i] = 1.
The correctness of this equation is shown as follows:
Here, we can write r u = r u − a/F (u). Thus the private key generated by the simulator can be written as
which is a valid and mathematically consistent private key for the identity ID u queried by A.
Signcrypt Queries
When A queries the Signcrypt oracle for signcryption of a message m by the user with identity ID A as sender and the user with identity ID B as the intended receiver, B simulates a valid ciphertext as follows.
where r A is the randomness stored for ID A in the list l r . Otherwise choose r A ∈ Z p randomly and store it in l r . Note that l r is the list that stores ID u , r u tuples.
where β ⊆ {1, 2, ..., l} denotes the set of indices j such that β[j] = 1. The equation above for σ 5 is correct because g
The ciphertext σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 , τ is sent to the adversary A. Here, the Signcrypt queries never abort and they do not need an Extract query for the sender identity ID A within them.
Unsigncrypt Queries
When A queries σ, ID A , ID B i.e the unsigncryption of the ciphertext σ which was signcrypted by the sender ID A for the intended receiver ID B , to the Unsigncrypt oracle simulated by B, it proceeds as follows. B does an Extract query for the receiver identity ID B . If the Extract query does not abort, B receives the private key for ID B as output from the Extract oracle as
The simulator uses the private keys d U S B , d R B got from the extract oracle to unsigncrypt the ciphertext σ using the Unsigncrypt algorithm as given in the Scheme.
If the extract query aborts i.e if F (B) = 0 mod p, the simulator proceeds as follows. The simulator calculates ∆ as given below.
Now, we can obtain the message as follows.
This message can be returned if the verification in Eq. (1) is satisfied. Thus, the Unsigncrypt queries never abort even if the Extract queries for the corresponding receiver identities abort.
Challenge Phase
The adversary A can adaptively ask polynomially bound number of these Extract, Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt queries to B. When A decides that training is enough, it produces two messages m * 0 and m * 1 along with the sender identity ID * A and receiver identity ID * B adaptively and sends them to the challenger. The challenger randomly chooses γ ∈ {0, 1} and then simulates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
, where g c and T are taken by B from the DBDH tuple given and τ * ∈ R {0, 1} lτ .
where r A ∈ Z p is randomly chosen
where β * ⊆ {1, 2, ..., l} denotes the set of indices j such that β
Note that, the simulator will be able to successfully simulate the challenge ciphertext without aborting, as explained above, only if F (B * ) = 0 mod p. The simulator aborts if F (B * ) = 0 mod p as it will not be able to simulate the component σ 3 when F (B * ) = 0 mod p.
, τ * is sent to the adversary A.
Here, if the simulator B was given a valid DBDH tuple i.e. if T =ê(g, g) abc , then the challenge ciphertext σ * = σ
Training Phase II
In this phase, the simulator answers to the queries from the adversary A in the same way as it did in the Training Phase I. Here, A cannot ask for the Unsigncrypt query of the challenge ciphertext σ * with sender identity as ID * A and receiver identity as ID * B and the Extract query for the receiver identity ID * B .
The strength of our scheme is that the adversary can again query the Signcrypt Oracle for the signcryption of either of the challenge ciphertexts m * 0 or m * 1 with the sender identity as ID * A and receiver identity as ID * B , during this phase. A can also query the Extract oracle for the sender identity ID * A , which makes our scheme insider secure.
Guess Phase
When the adversary A decides the training is enough, A outputs its guess γ of γ.
If the guess γ = γ, then the simulator outputs that T in the given DBDH tuple is valid i.e T =ê(g, g) abc . Otherwise B outputs that g, g a , g b , g c , T is not valid DBDH tuple.
Thus, B simulates a challenger for the adversary A and solves the DBDH problem with a probability from the forgery produced by A. This concludes the description of the simulation.
Analysis
In this section, we analyse the probability with which the simulator will be able to solve the hard problem DBDH, given that the adversary is able to produce a valid forgery with a non-negligible probability . The simulation done is completed without aborting if in all the Extract queries, F (u) = 0 mod l u (since l u (n u + 1) < p, F (u) = 0 mod l u =⇒ F (u) = 0 mod p ), for the identity ID u during the Training phase and if F (u * ) = 0 mod p during the Challenge phase. Thus, l u set as 2(q E ), sets a bound on the number of Extract queries to be asked by A, whereas no bound is needed for the number of Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt queries because the signcryption and the unsigncryption oracles are always simulated without aborting. Let us assume the events A i , A * as follows.
Thus, from the analysis done above probability for the simulation not aborting is
Since l u (n u + 1) < p, F (u) = 0 mod p implies F (u) = 0 mod l u . For the event A * to occur, x + i∈Ω x i = 0 mod l u , hence F (u * ) = 0 mod l u . And also, there should be a unique value of k u , where 0 ≤ k u ≤ n u , such that F (u * ) = 0 mod p. Here, k u is randomly chosen. So, the probability for the event A * to occur is
Since, the adversary cannot produce forgery on a message for which an Extract query is asked, the events A i and A * are independent. Also, the events A i and A j i.e F (u i ) = 0 mod p and F (u j ) = 0 mod p are independent. So,
Thus, the probability for not aborting becomes,
Thus, the probability for the challenger to produce a valid forgery is defined as
The tightness of the security reduction in the proof of CCIA2 security of our scheme is of the order of the tightness of security reduction of Waters' scheme [26] .
Unforgeability
We now prove the unforgeability property, Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Message and Identity Attack (SUF-CMIA) of our scheme with the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
If there exists an SUF-CMIA adversary for our scheme who can create valid ciphertexts during the SUF-CMIA game explained above, with a non-negligible probability when it runs for a polynomial time t, asking at most q E extract queries, q S signcrypt queries and q U S unsigncrypt queries, then there exists another algorithm, who can solve the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem with probability in polynomial time t , where ≥ 4κq E (n u + 1)(n m + 1)
where n u is the length of the identity string and n m is the length of the message, κ is the security parameter, t m , t e , t p are the time required for each multiplication, each exponentiation and each bilinear pairing respectively and l is a value large enough such that the hash functions outputting {0, 1} l in the scheme are collision resistant.
Proof
Let us assume that a ( , t, q E , q S , q U S )-adversary A for our scheme exists. We will construct another algorithm B from this adversary A, who can solve the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem with a nonnegligible probability in polynomial time t .
The algorithm B receives a CDH tuple g, g a , g b , where g is a generator of prime order group G of order p. B simulates a challenger for the adversary A to calculate g ab from the tuple given. This simulation is described as follows:
Setup
The simulator B sets l u = 2(q E ) and l m = κ, where κ is the security parameter. Here, the values of q S and q U S are not included while calculating l u because the Signcrypt queries do not abort when the Extract query within them aborts and the Unsigncrypt queries do need an Extract query within them. B then chooses two integers k u , k m randomly such that 0 ≤ k u ≤ n u and 0 ≤ k m ≤ n m . For the given values of q E , q S , q U S , n u and n m , we assume that l u (n u + 1) < p and l m (n m + 1) < p. Then, B chooses the elements x ∈ Z lu and z ∈ Z lm randomly and also chooses two vectors X = (x i ) of length n u and Z = (z i ) of length l where the elements of X are chosen randomly from Z lu and the elements of Z are chosen randomly from Z lm , with l large enough so that the hash functions are collision resistant. B also chooses two integers y and w randomly from Z p and two vectors Y = (y i ) of length n u and W = (w i ) of length l, where the elements of Y and W are chosen randomly from Z p .
Here we define two pairs of functions for a user with identity ID u and for a value β ∈ {0, 1} l as follows:
where d, θ and θ are chosen randomly from Z p . Here, g a and g b are taken by B from the CDH tuple.
Finally, B chooses an integer e randomly from Z p and a vector E = (e i ) of length n u , where the elements of E are chosen randomly from Z p .
There are four one-way, collision resistant, cryptographic hash functions defined as
Training Phase
Extract Queries
The simulator B does not know the master secret key g a 2 . So, when the adversary A asks for the private key of an identity ID u , B responds as follows. B calculates F (u) for the identity ID u . If F (u) = 0 mod p, the simulator aborts. Otherwise, B randomly chooses r u ∈ Z p and calculates the private key as
Signcrypt Queries
When A queries the Signcrypt oracle for signcryption of message m by the identity ID A and with ID B as the intended receiver, B simulates a valid ciphertext as follows.
B asks for the Extract query of the sender identity ID A . If F (A) = 0 mod l u , B follows the Signcrypt algorithm using the private key d A for identity ID A got from the Extract algorithm to signcrypt the given message m as done by identity ID A and with ID B as the intended receiver.
Else if F (A) = 0 mod p, B proceeds as follows. 
This can happen only when where F (A * ) = 0 mod p and K(β * ) = 0 mod p. The simulator aborts otherwise.
Thus, the simulator solves the given instance of the CDH problem with probability , from the forgery produced by the adversary A, by simulating a challenger for A.
Analysis
Here, we analyse the probability with which the simulator will be able to solve the instance of the CDH problem given to the challenger, given that the adversary is able to produce a valid forgery with a nonnegligible probability . The simulation done is completed without aborting if for all the Extract queries of identity ID u , F (u) = 0 mod l u and if F (u * ) = 0 mod p and K(β * ) = 0 mod p during the Forgery phase. Let us assume the events A i , A * and B * as follows.
A i : F (u) = 0 mod l u ; A * : F (u * ) = 0 mod p ; B * : K(β * ) = 0 mod p Thus, from the analysis done above, the probability for the simulation not aborting is
The estimation of P r[¬Abort] is similar to the one done after the IND-CCIA2 game. The probability for the challenger to produce a valid forgery is defined as
Thus, the probability for the challenger to solve the instance of CDH problem in the unforgeability game is Θ(2 κ ) times more for our scheme than [20] . This makes the security reduction of our scheme tighter than [20] .
Efficiency
The Signcrypt algorithm of our scheme performs one bilinear pairing operation while calculatingê(g 1 , h 2 ) r . But note thatê(g 1 , h 2 ) can be precomputed before the protocol begins since both g 1 and h 2 are public parameters and they are same for all runs of the protocol. The algorithm also performs 5 exponentiations (4 of elements of group G and one of element of G T ). The unsigncrypt algorithm performs 6 bilinear pairing operations of whichê(g 1 , g 2 ) can be precomputed and one exponentiation of an element of group G. Note that the calculation of (h λ 1 h 3 ) ρ involves only one exponentiation according to the well known "square and multiply" technique explained in [19] . When the number of computations performed by our scheme and the scheme in Li et al. [14] are compared (excluding the precomputed values), our scheme performs one exponentiation less than [14] with same number of bilinear pairings.
Since none of the ID based signcryption schemes without random oracles are provably secure in the literature, we will compare the efficiency of our scheme with the ID based signcryption scheme π that was conceptually formatted in [21] obtained by the 'Sign then Encrypt' approach. Note that π is the most efficient signcryption scheme that can be got by the direct combination of IBE and IBS schemes, since [20] and [12] are the most efficient IBS and IBE schemes with SUF-CMA and IND-CCA2 properties respectively in the standard model. The numbers shown in the brackets indicate the values that can be precomputed before the algorithm begins (and they remain same for all runs of the protocol)
Conclusion
We have presented the first secure ID based signcryption scheme and proven its security in the standard model. This scheme satisfies the strongest notions of security available for the signcryption schemes. Moreover, it has additional interesting properties such as public ciphertext verifiability which is very useful in the context of firewalls and spam filters. The security reduction is also tighter compared to many other schemes in the standard model. There is a trade-off in this scheme between the size of public parameters and the tightness to the underlying hard assumption. In our scheme we have included some extra parameters namely a unsigncryption key to increase the probability to a much larger value so that the security of our scheme is more tight to the underlying hard problem much more than the existing signcryption schemes. An interesting and potential future direction will be designing a more efficient protocol with reduced public parameters, key size and reduced ciphertext size.
